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I. INTRODUCTION
I walked out of class and received one of the most
terrifying phone calls of my life. My mother, a strong, beautiful,
selfless woman, had collapsed on the floor of the hospital,
requiring her fourth blood transfusion in a matter of months in
an attempt to sustain her failing liver. She had been waiting
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for an organ donation and transplant for many years; one that
would never come.
The next day, a young and healthy college student dies
tragically in a car accident. As an adult, he had told his family
members that he wanted to be an organ donor. The day of his
untimely death, the same day his intended organ donation
must be effectuated,1 his grieving parents cannot stomach the
thought of organs being removed from their sons lifeless body.
Despite the multiple lives his donation could save,2 the hospital
acquiesces to the familys emotion-ridden objection.3 As a
result, the gracious young mans organs die along with him, his
directives regarding his own body are not followed, and
thousands of people, including my mother, continue to wait.
At the same time, in the slums of an impoverished country,
the leader of a criminal cartel recognizes that unsatisfied
demand can bring exorbitant prices, especially when the
buyers life is on the line. He concocts a highly profitable, yet
unimaginably ruthless new business plan and begins illegally
obtaining and selling organs on the aptly named red market.4
An affluent patient recognizes this precious opportunity to
escape the endless waiting list, and drains his savings account
to purchase an organ, trying hard to forget the horror and
immorality that surround the transaction.5
These nightmares are a reality for the hundreds of
thousands of people affected by one of the worst sociomedical
1. LOUIS A. GAMINO & R. HAL RITTER, JR., ETHICAL PRACTICE IN GRIEF
COUNSELING 152 (2009) (In cases of donation after cardiac death, recovery of
donated organs begins immediately following a waiting period of 25 minutes
after life support has been withdrawn . . . . Immediacy of organ recovery for
transplant is necessary because vital organs deteriorate so quickly after loss of
blood supply and oxygen.).
2. See About Transplantation, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/ (last visited Sept.
7, 2016) (stating one cadaveric organ donation can save eight lives); see also
Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal
Considerations in Rejecting a Deceaseds Anatomical Gift Because There Is No
Consent by the Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 323, 324 (2002) (illustrating that, on
average, between three and four organs are recovered from each cadaveric
donor).
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. See Erica D. Roberts, When the Storehouse Is Empty, Unconscionable
Contracts Abound: Why Transplant Tourism Should Not Be Ignored, 52 HOW.
L.J. 747, 76568 (2009) (explaining how this activity, dubbed transplant
tourism, is an increasingly common and troublesome issue).
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dilemmas of the century. The numeric figures are nothing short
of shocking. This crisis kills 30 Americans every day.6 It
devastates the quality of life for over 100,000 more.7 It costs the
national economy tens of billions of dollars annually,8 supports
international organized crime, and motivates human
trafficking and murder.9 This crisis is the national organ
shortage.
The demand for donated organs absolutely dwarfs the
supply.10 In 2012, slightly more than 14,000 people donated
organs while 117,000 continued to suffer on the transplant
waiting list.11 As of September 2016, the waiting list has grown
to over 120,000.12 Sadly, approximately 8,000 of those waiting
will die this year.13
An incredibly complicated problem, the organ shortage has
several causes, including: Americans unwillingness to register
as organ donors,14 objections by family members that
contravene the intended donors wishes, and hospital
procedures and customs that allow the familys objection to
stop an intended donation.15
This Note advocates a controversial, yet straightforward
and effective solution to the national organ crisis
incentivizing cadaveric organ donation with monetary
compensation. A new national donor registry would enhance
6. Keith Humphreys, An Organ Shortage Kills 30 Americans Every Day.
Is It Time to Pay Donors?, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/10/20/an-organ-shortage-kills-
30-americans-every-day-is-it-time-to-pay-donors/.
7. Id. at 762 n.107.
8. Id. at 76667.
9. Mexican Cartel Member Busted for Child Organ Trafficking,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 18, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/18/mexican-
cartel-member-busted-for-child-organ-trafficking/.
10. See generally UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT (2013), http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2012.pdf.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, U.S. DEPT OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2016) (reporting data from 2003-2015).
13. Id. (On average, 22 people die each day while waiting for a
transplant.).
14. See Tara Parker-Pope, The Reluctant Organ Donor, N.Y. TIMES: WELL
(Apr. 16, 2009, 11:20 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/the-
reluctant-organ-donor/ (reporting that only 38% of licensed drivers are
registered organ donors).
15. See infra Part II.C.
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the integrity and efficiency of the current donation system.16
Donors and their families would be motivated and rewarded by
a moderate payment to the decedents estate after a donation
occurs.17 The proposed financial incentive would increase
donations, familiar consent, and the transplantable organ
supply.18 In turn, a greater amount of donated organs would
decrease deaths and suffering of those waiting for an organ,
reduce violations of the donors wishes, and fight the horrific
illegal trade of organs.19
Part II provides the legal background on this topic,
including state law, federal law, hospital custom, and human
rights implications. Part III begins by outlining the details of
the proposed national donor registry and incentivization
system. Part III.B discusses how the proposal would alleviate
several problems caused by the organ shortage, including
increasing the organ supply, respecting donors wishes, curbing
national healthcare costs, and reducing the red market and
related crime. Part III.C analyzes the proposals limitations
and offers additional recommendations. The Note concludes by
imploring national legislative action to implement this
proposal.
II. BACKGROUND
The organ donation system is regulated by state laws,
federal statutes, government agencies, and hospital customs
and procedures.20 States regulate organ donation and maintain
donor registries.21 Under federal authority,22 the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) matches
donated organs with transplant recipients.23 The donation and
procurement (removing transplantable organs from the donors
16. Infra Part III.A.1.
17. Infra Part III.A.2.
18. Infra Part III.B.12.
19. Infra Part III.B.34.
20. See, e.g., Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2012)
(illustrating this relationship through the courts legal analysis of an issue
involving bone marrow transplants).
21. See J.D. Punch et al., Organ Donation and Utilization in the United
States, 1996-2005, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1327, 133335 (2007).
22. See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).
23. See generally Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
supra note 12.
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body) process is also heavily influenced by hospital policies.24
Even with express donative intent, the hospital will often seek
and defer to the familys wishes instead of the decedents.25
This practice conflicts the rights of several parties and has
produced a significant organ shortage.26 The following section
describes the relevant state laws, federal statutes, hospital
custom, and natural human rights that create the framework of
organ donation law.
A. STATE LAW
Soon after organ transplantation became a viable medical
procedure in the 1960s, states began enacting legislation
regarding the donation and procurement of organs.27 In order
to promote uniformity amongst the states and facilitate
effective regulation, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968.28 The UAGA allows adults of sound
mind to donate all or any part of their body at death.29 The
intent to donate must be expressed in writing and signed by
the declarant and two witnesses.30 The true decision-maker,
however, was the decedents next of kin: if the surviving
spouse, or any child of an unmarried donor, opposed the
donation, it was no longer authorized.31 Every state adopted
the original version of the UAGA.32
Over the past fifty years, advancements in medicine, law,
and ethics have introduced new challenges and issues not
addressed by the UAGA. The drafters of the uniform law
published revised versions in 1987 and 2006.33 The 1987
24. See Punch et al., supra note 21, at 1332.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See Humphreys, supra note 6.
27. See Daniel T. Stimson, Private Solicitation of Organ Donors: A Threat
to the Fairness of the U.S. Organ Transplant System, or a Solution to the
National Organ Shortage?, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 349, 35152 (2006).
28. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMMN
1968).
29. Id. § 2(a).
30. Id. § 4(b).
31. Id. § 2(c).
32. REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW
COMMN 2006).
33. Compare REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006), with
REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMMN 1987).
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version lifted two significant restrictions: witnesses are no
longer required on the donative document, and the donors next
of kin are no longer required to consent to the donation.34
Recognizing the value of donor autonomy and the ever-growing
organ shortage problem, the most recent version of the UAGA
further broadens the scope of permissible organ donation.35
Donative intent can be communicated orally or symbolically;36
an individual who is old enough to apply for a drivers license is
old enough to decide to donate;37 and individuals other than the
decedent can donate his body unless the decedent expressly
refused during his lifetime.38
Almost all of the states have adopted the 2006 UAGA,39
but many have supplemented or otherwise modified the
uniform law.40 As a result, [t]he law among the various states
is no longer uniform and harmonious, and the diversity of law
is an impediment to the success of the organ transplantation
system.41 Each state maintains its own donor registry, which is
often but not always linked with drivers licensing.42 State laws
also vary in their donation education program, if one exists at
34. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (UNIF. LAW COMMN 1987)
(An anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is
irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person
after the donors death.).
35. REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (2006).
36. Id. § 5.
37. Id. § 4(1).
38. Id. § 7.
39. See Legislative Fact Sheet  Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%282006%29 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016)
(listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
40. See, e.g., Emily Denham Morris, The Organ Trail: Express Versus
Presumed Consent as Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage, 90 KY. L.J.
1125, 113132 (2002).
41. REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW
COMMN 2006).
42. See, e.g., State Organ Donation Legislation, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation_micro/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2016).
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all,43 and the specifics of what qualifies as legal consent for
donation.44 Despite these differences, all states must comply
with federal law.45 The following section examines the main
federal statute pertaining to organ donation: the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984.46
B. FEDERAL LAW
Problems with the promising and quickly growing organ
transplantation industry drew Congressional attention in the
early 1980s.47 Continuous medical advancements, which
increased the demand for donated organs, coupled with
hospital custom issues, discussed infra, created a nationwide
shortage.48 This shortage of life-saving organs provoked
questionable commercial endeavors49 and national security
concerns.50 In response, Congress passed the National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984.51 The National Organ Transplant Act
changed the legal landscape of organ donation in two ways: it
established the OPTN and outlawed the sale of human
organs.52
The OPTN is tasked with (1) maintaining the organ
transplant waiting list, (2) matching donated organs with an
appropriate recipient, (3) amassing, analyzing, and distributing
data on organ transplantation, and (4) work[ing] actively to
increase the supply of donated organs,53 all on a national
scale.54 The OPTN is currently managed under contract by the
United Network for Organ Sharing, a private nonprofit entity,
and is overseen by the federal Department of Health and
43. See id. (showing that fewer than half of states have organ donation
education programs).
44. See id.
45. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that Federal
law generally takes precedence over state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).
47. Stimson, supra note 27, at 353.
48. See Punch et al., supra note 21, at 133637; see also Humphreys,
supra note 6.
49. Stimson, supra note 27, at 35354.
50. See infra Part III.B.4.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 274.
52. Id. § 274.
53. Id. § 274(b)(2)(K).
54. See Stimson, supra note 27, at 355.
280 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
Human Services.55 The effectiveness of the OPTN is ensured by
the power of the purse; hospitals are ineligible for Medicare
payments if they fail to comply with OPTN rules and
requirements.56
The National Organ Transplant Act also filled a gap in
state law regarding the sale of organs57 by prohibiting the
acquisition, receipt, or transfer [of] any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation.58
Only paired donation arrangements and reasonable payments
for removing, preserving, and implanting the organ are
permitted.59 Violation of this law is a felony punishable by up
to five years in prison and a $50,000 fine.60
Since the landmark National Organ Transplant Act,
federal legislation in the area of organ donation and
transplantation has been sparse.61 The Organ Donation and
Recovery Improvement Act of 2004 focused on public
awareness, education, and research grants.62 In 2009, Congress
considered a proposed Organ Trafficking Prohibition Act, which
would allow noncash benefits for organ donation, including
payment of burial expenses, insurance, and tax credits.63
Despite support from the American Medical Association, the
bill did not pass.64
While federal and state legislatures and courts remain
relatively quiet, internal hospital protocol dictates the true
55. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1)(A); see also Stimson, supra note 27, at 355.
56. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-
8(a)(1)(B) (2012).
57. See Patrick D. Carlson, The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and
Improvement Act: How Congress Missed an Opportunity to Say Yes to
Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY
136, 141 (2006) (explaining how the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act failed to
mention explicitly the sale of organs).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b).
61. See generally Selected Statutory and Regulatory History of Organ
Transplantation, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www
.organdonor.gov/about_dot/laws/history.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
62. See Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
216, 118 Stat. 584 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Cody Corley, Money as a Motivator: The Cure to Our Nations Organ
Shortage, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 93, 100 (2011).
64. Id. at 10001.
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framework of organ donation.65 This custom of consent
directly contradicts and limits the efficacy of statutes and
programs designed to support donor autonomy and increase
organ donation.66
C. HOSPITAL CUSTOM
The law is clear: a person other than the donor is barred
from . . . revoking an anatomical gift of a donors body or
part.67 Reality, however, is much different. In reality, even if
the decedent has signed a document of gift, and such document
is on his person at the time of death, hospitals and organ
procurement organizations will almost never retrieve organs
without the [familys] consent . . . .68 Even silence (failure to
locate the decedents next of kin quickly enough) can cause
failure to procure donated organs.69 Routinely, most
physicians follow the wishes of the deceaseds family, which
are often in direct conflict with the deceaseds express desire to
donate.70
This issue is extremely complicated, long-standing, and
has huge implications on the supply of donated organs. In 1990,
an article in the Harvard Law Review identified several
reasons why hospitals and their agents defer to familial
65. SeeMorris, supra note 40, at 1131.
66. Id.
67. REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (UNIF. LAW COMMN
2006); see Anatomical Gift Act (2006) Summary, UNIF. LAW. COMMN.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20
Act%20 (2006) (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) ([U]nder Section 8 of the 2006
UAGA, . . . there is no reason to seek consent from the donors family because
the family has no legal right to revoke the gift.).
68. Alexandra K. Glazier, The Brain Dead Patient Was Kept Alive and
Other Disturbing Misconceptions; A Call for Amendments to the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 640, 645 (2000) (emphasis
added).
69. See Bucklin, supra note 2, at 337 (citing Jeffrey M. Prottas, The Rules
for Asking and Answering: The Role of Law in Organ Donation, 63 U. DET. L.
REV. 183, 186 (1985)) (describing the high amount of cadaveric organs lost due
to the next of kin consent procurement agencies require, despite the presence
of a signed organ donor card).
70. Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States
System of Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric
Organ Donor Act: And the Winner Is . . ., 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 32 (1994)
(illustrating the practical reasons why some physicians require familial
consent before harvesting an organ, despite having legal immunity when an
organ donor card is present).
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consent in contradiction to statutory law and the decedents
intent to donate:
[U]nwarranted fears of legal liability, a legitimate concern that
negative publicity might damage further organ procurement efforts,
a desire to respect the familys wishes, an unwillingness to cause the
grieving family any more stress, [and] physicians reluctance to ask
something of the family when they were unable to save the
patient . . . .71
Placing oneself in the physicians shoes reveals the
inherent complexity of the situation when a spouse is informed
that her life partner has died, and moments later is informed
that the organ procurement team intends to begin retrieving
his organs.72 The necessary brevity between death and organ
71. Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1619 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (indicating the
shortcomings of the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
72. An educational commentary published by the American Medical
Association describes the typical reaction when a wife is informed that her
donor husband is brain dead. Frustratingly, brain dead patients can be an
extremely valuable source of donated organs, especially the heart and lungs.
What do you mean, hes dead? she asked. Hes breathing. Hes
not cold or even pale. Hes not dead.
His brain is not functioning, Mrs. Polaski, Dr. Nichols stepped
in to explain.[ ] He cant breathe or do anything else on his own.
Well, fine. Just leave him on that machine. Hes not dead. I can
see hes not dead. He doesnt look like dead people look. Dont touch
him.
Dr. Nichols tried a couple more times to explain, but Mrs. Polaski
said, Even if he really does die, that doesnt mean you can cut him
open and take his organs. Im his wife. You have to give his body to
me, and I dont want it all cut up and mutilated. I wont let you do it.
Dr. Nichols discovered that he was saying the same thing over
and overyour husband is dead and he wanted to help another
person live by donating his organs. He could not bring himself to say,
We dont need your permission to take your husbands organs. We
can take them on the basis of the signed intent to be an organ donor
on his license.
John C. Moskop, Organ Donation: When Consent Confronts Refusal, VIRTUAL
MENTOR (Feb. 2003), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2003/02/ccas2-0302
.html (second emphasis added). The article inquires: What should Dr. Nichols
do? Id. Tellingly, even the American Medical Association does not have a clear
answer. Id. The commentary instructs that instead of the attending physician,
a representative from the organ procurement organization (OPO) should
discuss the decedents intended donation with his widow, and that this
delicate conversation must be handled with extreme care. Id.When the spouse
continues to object and the decedent is a registered donor, should organ
procurement occur?
The decision to procure an organ is a responsibility of the OPO. A
survey of the 61 US OPOs published in 2001 reveals widespread
diversity in consent practices for cadaveric organ donation. Despite
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procurement complicates the emotional nature of cadaveric
organ donation.73 As a practical matter, discussions about
futility of medical treatment, withdrawing care, and potential
organ donation often occur in the same time frame, if not
within the same conversation.74 From this viewpoint, it is
easier to understand how families may object to organ
procurement, and how the hospital may allow their wishes to
trump an intended organ donation.
Unfortunately, this scenario happens frequently and is a
significant contribution to the organ shortage crisisreports
indicate that familial objection may stop up to half of cadaveric
organ donations.75 [I]t [is] apparent that the organ shortage is
not due to public refusal or objection to organ donation, but
rather to a system that has failed to carry out the wishes of the
decedent donor.76 An article in the Yale Journal of Health
Policy, Law & Ethics co-authored by an attorney and a medical
doctor states a poignant statistic: Lack of permission [from the
decedent or his family] to use . . . suitable organs leads to about
sixteen deaths daily in the United States and is why over
85,000 candidates remain on transplant waiting lists.77
Rectifying the discrepancy between law and custom is a
difficult puzzle, but one that must be solved. Further
complicating the problem are the inherent human rights of the
donor, his family, and the potential recipient.
this diversity, however, only 5 OPOs (8 percent) reported that they
were likely to procure organs based on a persons wishes as indicated
on a drivers license, if the next of kin objected to donation.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
73. See GAMINO & RITTER, supra note 1, at 152 (organ procurement must
begin almost immediately after cardiac death).
74. Id. (internal citation omitted).
75. See Carlson, supra note 57, at 138 (citing Francis L. Delmonico et al.,
Organ Donation and Utilization in the United States, 2004, 5 AM. J. OF
TRANSPLANTATION 862, 86566 (2005)) (noting that although 10,500-13,800
people are eligible to become donors each year, a much smaller number
actually become donors).
76. See Lisa E. Douglass, Organ Donation, Procurement and
Transplantation: The Process, the Problems, the Law, 65 UMKC L. REV. 201,
202 (1996) ([A]lmost 70% of Americans polled said they were willing to
donate all or parts of their bodies. On the other hand, when Americans were
asked about donating a family members organs, only 36% responded
affirmatively.)
77. Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate
Organ Donation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 293, 294 (2005).
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D. HUMAN RIGHTS
The law surrounding organ donation and transplantation
implicates several fundamental human rights.78 First, and
arguably paramount, is the prospective donors right to
autonomy over his own body.79 The Supreme Court has long
recognized a constitutional right for individuals to unilaterally
make decisions regarding their healthcare: No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person.80 Scholars in philosophy, medicine, and the
law agree that personal autonomy, especially in the healthcare
context, is widely understood to be of enormous value and
benefit to individuals and society as a whole.81 Does the nearly
absolute right to autonomy over ones healthcare decisions82
extend to a right to decide whether to donate ones organs after
death?83
After death, does one retain any rights at all? Legal rules
and cultural norms have established respect for posthumous
wishes, especially in the area of probate law.84 A decedents
expressed intent regarding the distribution and use of his
78. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. See Douglass, supra note 76, at 213 (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ([A] person is allowed to donate all or part of their
body to hospitals, surgeons, physicians, or bank or storage facilities . . . or to
any specified individual for therapy or transplantation.).
80. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing
to force the plaintiff to submit to a surgical examination); see also Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.). See
generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a constitutional right
to decide whether or not to bear a child); Eisenhardt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (confirming a constitutional right to obtain and use contraceptives).
81. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated
Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POLY 251, 273 (2005).
82. The government can limit an individuals right to autonomy over
healthcare decisions only if the state proves a compelling state interest, and
the limitation is narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
83. Statutory law would say yes, but the current practice of forging
procurement of organs without the donors familys consent indicates no. See
discussion supra Part II.C.
84. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV.
763, 764 (2009).
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personal and real property can be enforced for hundreds of
years.85 However, death does kill most rights.86 The right to
dictate disposal of ones body falls in a grey area between the
two extremes. States generally recognize a common law right to
a decent burial and to choose the location and manner of
disposal of ones body.87 At the same time, the next of kin are
also granted a quasi-property right to receive the decedents
body and arrange for its burial.88 The current conundrum of
organ donation rights is a perfect example of this tension:
statutory law affords autonomy over the decision to donate, but
hospital custom allows the next of kin to contravene the
decedents wishes.89
Aside from the donor and his family, other persons human
rights are affected by this plight. Tens of thousands of
Americans suffer a lower quality of life every day they spend
waiting on an organ transplant list.90 Many more have died
waiting.91 The organ shortage crisis also jeopardizes the
economy and national security by funding an illegal black
market for human organs.92 These problemsand a proposed
solutionare discussed further in the following section.
85. For example, conservation easements are even exempt from the Rule
Against Perpetuities. See generally Nancy A. McLaughlin & Jeff Pidot,
Conservation Easement Enabling Statutes: Perspectives on Reform, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 811 (2013).
86. See Smolensky, supra note 84, at 763 (noting that the dead no longer
have a right to maintain privacy, marry, divorce, vote, or sue for certain
claims).
87. See, e.g., Kimberly E. Naguit, Letting the Dead Bury the Dead:
Missouris Right of Sepulcher Addresses the Modern Decedents Wishes, 75 MO.
L. REV. 249, 251 n.20 (2010); John A. Gebauer, Duty of Burial or Cremation,
18 N.Y. JUR. 2D CEMETERIES AND DEAD BODIES § 75 (2016).
88. Naguit, supra note 87, at 251.
89. See Glazier, supra note 68 (stating that a doctor will almost never
take an organ from a prospective donor without the consent of that donors
next of kin).
90. See UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 2012 REPORT supra note
10, at 2.
91. See John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant
Program: When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 197,
197 (1994) ([E]ach day at least six . . . die before an organ becomes
available.).
92. See T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, On the Ethics of Paying
Organ Donors: An Economics Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 827, 83435
(2006) (describing the problems created by the black market).
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III. ANALYSIS
To remedy the organ shortage crisis, cadaveric organ
donation should be incentivized with monetary compensation.
In addition, a consolidated national donor registry would
improve and synchronize the process of expressing ones intent
to donate. These proposals are discussed in detail in Part III.A.
Part III.B explores the many benefits of this proposal: (1)
increased organ donation, (2) decreased familiar objections, (3)
fewer deaths, less suffering, and a more cost-efficient
healthcare system, and (4) less organized crime related to the
illegal trade of organs on the red market. Lastly, Part III.C
considers limitations of the proposal and additional
recommendations.
A. PROPOSAL
This Notes proposal is two-fold. First, the current state-by-
state system for registering as an organ donor should be
consolidated into a single national registry.93 This will
eliminate interstate discrepancies and inefficiencies.94 It will
also strengthen the validity of a prospective donors donative
intent.95 Second, to incentivize registration and donation, a
monetary payment should be given in exchange for each
cadaveric organ donation.96
1. National Donor Registry
A single national organ donor registry would significantly
improve the United States organ donation system. Currently,
each state maintains its own unique registry and donative
consent laws.97 This disjointed system results in legal
inconsistencies, difficulty in locating and maintaining records,
93. See generally Sten, supra note 91, at 197203.
94. See id. at 21213.
95. See supra notes 6770 and accompanying text (illustrating the
restrictive qualities of the current laws and standards with regard to donative
intent).
96. See Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 84950 (By continuing to
forestall the adoption . . . of this most promising solution to the organ
shortage, the opponents of financial incentives are effectively condemning
thousands more patients to death each year.).
97. See supra notes 4044 and accompanying text.
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and systematic inefficiency.98 A donor may register in one
state, pass away in another state, and his family may be
accustomed to the laws of a third state.99 Finding the
decedents expression of donative intent is unduly cumbersome
with dozens of potential state registries.100 This is especially
problematic because a decision regarding procurement usually
must be made within hours of death.101 A unified federal
registry would simplify, expedite, and harmonize the process of
determining the decedents wishes.
The new registry could be consolidated with the
preexisting OPTN, the federally-funded program that
maintains the transplant waiting list and matches donated
organs with an appropriate recipient.102 The organization that
administers the OPTN has extensive experience and expertise
in managing a nationwide medical registry.103 This
organization, the United Network for Organ Sharing, has
fulfilled the role of administering the OPTN since 1986.104 The
United Network for Organ Sharing could certainly operate an
organ donor registry more efficiently and effectively than fifty
separate state systems. The OPTN could be easily expanded to
include a donor registry list in addition to the current
transplant waiting list.105 An amendment to the federal statute
that mandates the OPTN106 and a justifiable amount of
additional funding107 would achieve this change.
98. See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note
(UNIF. LAW COMMN 2006) (The law among the various states is no longer
uniform and harmonious, and the diversity of law is an impediment to
transplantation.).
99. See id.; cf. supra notes 4044 and accompanying text.
100. REVISED UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (2006).
101. See GAMINO & RITTER, supra note 1, at 152.
102. See supra notes 5456 and accompanying text.
103. See Stimson, supra note 27, at 355.
104. Timeline of Historical Events Significant Milestones in Organ
Donation and Transplantation, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://
www.organdonor.gov/legislation/timeline.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2016)
(listing the history of significant events in organ donation and
transplantation).
105. See Sten, supra note 91, at 217 (advocating that expanding the role of
the OPTN would be the best option for administering the authors proposed
death benefit program).
106. E.g., National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).
107. The economic burden of maintaining an organ donation registry would
be transferred from state governments to the federal government. This change
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Medical record-keeping throughout the United States is
developing from an inefficient and outdated segregated
structure to a consolidated and electronic nationwide
network.108 Efforts to nationalize healthcare records have been
successful at dramatically reducing costs and improving the
quality of care.109 Cadaveric organ donor registration should
follow this trend to achieve these important improvements. A
federal registry is already used for bone marrow donation and
transplantation.110 The program has operated for almost thirty
years, and is one of the best in the world.111
A national donor registry would also improve the validity
and increase the legitimacy of expressions of donative intent.112
In the status quo, almost all states integrate organ donor
registration with drivers licensing.113 There are several
downsides to this combination.114 First, the donor is asked to
check the box if you want to be an organ donor when applying
for a drivers license or permit at fifteen or sixteen years old.115
would result in a net economic benefit to society because a single federal
system is more efficient than dozens of separate state systems. See generally
Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77. The cost of maintaining a national registry
would be minimal. Id. at 324. Further, the federal government already
contributes funding to the majority of states organ donation registration
programs. See State Organ Donation Legislation, supra note 42.
108. See, e.g., Deth Sao, Amar Gupta & David A. Gantz, Interoperable
Electronic Health Care Record: A Case for Adoption of a National Standard to
Stem the Ongoing Health Care Crisis, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 55 (2013)
(Plagued by a tarnished reputation of bureaucracy, inefficiency, and
mediocre care, the [Department of Veterans Affairs] sought to reinvent itself
by implementing structural, organizational, and technological changes.).
109. See, e.g., id. at 5758 (relating the Department of Veterans Affairs
crisis to the broader U.S. healthcare records crisis and stating that the quality
of care has been drastically improved).
110. See Brian London, Should Bone Marrow Donors Be Paid to Save
Lives? An Assessment of the Legal Ban on Donor Compensation and Other
Obstacles Facing Domestic and International Bone Marrow Registries, 24
TEMP. INTL & COMP. L.J. 477, 48486 (2010) (explaining that Be The Match,
the federal registry for bone marrow transplantation, was created to facilitate
recruitment of unrelated bone marrow donors and increase the potential for
more transplants with unrelated bone marrow).
111. See id. at 485 (Be The Match is the largest and most comprehensive
registry of potential stem cell transplant donors in the world.).
112. See supra notes 6770 and accompanying text.
113. See State Organ Donation Legislation, supra note 42.
114. See Douglass, supra note 76, at 21314 (describing numerous flaws
with Missouris donor registration through drivers licensing program).
115. See Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77, at 30405.
2017] CADAVERIC ORGAN DONATION 289
The decision is often made with minimal forethought,
education, or information, and before the age of legal
majority.116 Second, family members and hospital personnel
may be reluctant to accept a spur-of-the-moment checkmark
several decades ago as genuine donative intent.117 Finally, the
decedents drivers license may not be easily located. If it
cannot be found immediately, the family may err on the side of
caution and deny the donation without a clear indication of the
decedents consent.118
All of these issues would be remedied by a national
registry. The prospective donor would express their intention to
donate by affirmatively registering as a donor.119 The donor
would have access to comprehensive information on the
donation and transplantation process.120 Instead of the current
all-or-nothing regime, the donor could choose full donation or
specify the particular organs they would like to donate.121 Their
precise wishes would be clearly and permanently recorded, and
their decision would be made with full consideration and as an
adult.122 Their directives would be more clear, thorough,
informed, and legitimate.123 Finally, the hospital and family
would be more willing to respect their intent to donate if it is
expressed through a trustworthy national database rather than
a box on their drivers license.124
There is one significant benefit to registering as an organ
donor through the state drivers licensing system: almost
116. Id. at 31819 (explaining that most peoples decision to become a
donor is part of a quid pro quo agreement).
117. Id.
118. See Douglass, supra note 76, at 215 ([I]f no clear intent of the
decedents wishes exists, the decedents next of kin make the ultimate
determination.).
119. See id. at 202.
120. Id.
121. The registry should also allow for citizens to register as non-donors if
they are not interested in being a cadaveric organ donor. The program could
also be expanded to allow for recordation of end-of-life medical care directives
(resuscitation, medical ventilation, tube feeding, dialysis, etc.) like a living
will.
122. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 76, at 21314 (showing the
ineffectiveness of the drivers license provision and indicating the need for a
more uniform system to assure the prompt harvest of organs from prospective
donors).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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everyone is given an automatic opportunity to identify
themselves as a donor when they apply for a drivers license.
The national registry could achieve this exposure by suggesting
donor registration whenever a citizen signs up for health
insurance, registers to vote, applies to marry, or pays income
taxes.125 To further incentivize registering as an organ donor,
the federal government should establish a program that
provides monetary compensation for cadaveric organ donation.
2. Monetary Payment
Financial compensation in exchange for organ donation is
certainly a controversial topic.126 On the one hand, it is
definitively illegal under federal statute.127 Opponents of the
idea argue that compensating organ donation is the
commodification of human body parts and an intrinsic
evil.128 They warn of negative consequences such as decreased
emotional gain for the donor family, decreased respect for life
and the sanctity of the human body, and a loss of the personal
link that currently exists in the donation process.129 There is
also an argument that compensating organ donation will lead
to exploitation of people in dire economic circumstances, who
will be coerced into donating when they otherwise would not
due to the financial reward.130 Others object based on religious
125. Congress has already authorized organ donation information to be
mailed with federal income tax refunds. See Timeline of Historical Events
Significant Milestones in Organ Donation and Transplantation, supra note
104.
126. See generally H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Giving, Selling, and
Having Taken: Conflicting Views of Organ Transfer, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
29, 35 (2004) (discussing conflicting moral views of organ sales).
127. See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012)
(It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation . . . .).
128. Engelhardt, supra note 126, at 35.
129. EDWARD W. NELSON ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONATION (1993), http://optn.transplant
.hrsa.gov [https://web.archive.org/web/20160106205231/http://optn.transplant
.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/financial-incentives-for-organ-donation].
130. See id. (Great concern has also been expressed regarding a potential
rich versus poor phenomena and the fact that financial need should not be
linked in a coercive way to giving consent for organ procurement.).
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beliefs,131 although scholars have had difficulty finding support
for this position in any dominant religious teachings.132
On the other hand, there are countless supporters of
creating a system that compensates organ donation.133
Proponents abound in the fields of medicine, law, and
economics.134 The American Medical Association supports
researching financial compensation as a way to increase
cadaveric organ donation.135 Nobel Prize-winning economist
Gary Becker do[es] not find compelling the arguments against
allowing the sale of organs, especially when weighed against
the number of lives that would be saved by the increased
supply stimulated by financial incentives.136 State
governments have toyed with the idea;137 seventeen states
provide an income tax deduction of up to $10,000 for living
organ donation.138 Lastly, a recent public opinion poll found
that sixty percent of Americans support a financial incentive
for organ donation.139
131. See Engelhardt, supra note 126, at 4347 (Many of the strong
institutions against a market in organs derive from a secular displacement of
prior religious views.).
132. See Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77, at 297 ([A]ll major religions
permit, if not encourage, life-enhancing donations.).
133. See id. at 31011.
134. See, e.g., Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 70, at 2829; Curtis E.
Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives
for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. &MED. 213, 232 (2001).
135. AM. MED. ASSN CODE OF ETHICS ch. 6.1.3 (2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-6.pdf.
136. Steven E. Levingston with Gary S. Becker, In Praise of Human Organ
Sales, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2009, 5:30 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/shortstack/2009/10/nobel_prize-winning_economist.html.
137. Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1994 whereby family members of
deceased donors would be reimbursed for funeral expenses to encourage
cadaveric organ donation. Carlson, supra note 57, at 146. The bill received
significant support in the organ transplantation community, and was
supported by ethicists, organ procurement organization executives,
physicians, and surgeons. Id. at 14849. Unfortunately, the program was
discontinued several years later after the Department of Health concluded
that the funeral benefit strayed too close to violating federal law prohibiting
valuable consideration for organs. Id. at 146.
138. Richard Knox, Tax Breaks for Organ Donors Arent Boosting
Transplant Supply, NPR (Aug. 31, 2012, 8:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs
/health/2012/08/30/160338259/tax-breaks-for-organ-donors-arent-boosting-
transplant-supply.
139. Scott Hensley, Poll: Americans Show Support for Compensation of
Organ Donors, NPR (May 15, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections
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Distinguished scholars, state governments, and the general
public agree that the benefits of financial incentives for organ
donation clearly outweigh any perceived risks.140 Proposals
vary regarding the type, amount, and timing of compensation
for donation.141 This Note proposes (1) a single lump sum
payment (2) to the donors estate (3) financed by the transplant
recipients health insurance provider (4) upon the event of an
executed cadaveric organ donation.
A monetary payment will provide additional motivation to
register as a cadaveric organ donor.142 In the status quo, organ
donation is purely altruistic; it is described as a selfless gift to
others without expectation of remuneration.143 However, the
devastating organ shortage crisis proves that altruism is
simply not sufficient to create a supply that meets the current
demand for donated organs.144 When the only impetus is
altruism, most people are not sufficiently motivated to commit
to donate. Although more than two-thirds of Americans express
a willingness to donate their own organs, less than half of the
public has formally committed to do so, and even fewer
actually donate.145 A secondary motivation is needed to solve
this problem.146
The promise of financial compensation will provide an
additional incentive for organ donation.147 More people will
register as donors, and families will be less likely to object to an
/health-shots/2012/05/16/152498553/poll-americans-show-support-for-compens
ation-of-organ-donors.
140. See supra notes 13439 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Sten, supra note 91, at 21315 (discussing general financial
incentive proposals and the death benefit pilot program); Alexander Tabarrok,
Life-Saving Incentives: Consequences, Costs and Solutions to the Organ
Shortage, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.econlib.org
/library/Columns/y2009/Tabarroklifesaving.html (outlining various proposals
for financial incentives).
142. See generally Harris & Alcorn, supra note 134, at 230.
143. Greg Moorlock, Jonathan Ives & Heather Draper, Altruism in Organ
Donation: An Unnecessary Requirement?, 40 J. MED. ETHICS 134, 134 (2013).
144. See supra notes 1113 and accompanying text; see also Harris &
Alcorn, supra note 134, at 22730.
145. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77, at 295 (footnotes omitted).
146. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 134, at 227 (The United States has
always relied upon altruism for organ procurement. While this system leaves
the decision to the individual and preserves personal autonomy, it does so at
the expense of effective organ procurement.).
147. See id. at 230 ([M]ore donors would step forward if given a certain
kind of nudge: that is, an economic incentive.).
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intended donation.148 In modern Western culture, money is
indisputably one of the strongest influences of human
behavior.149 Money is the main reason why most people spend
forty or more hours each week working; money is a dominant
factor in a boundless array of decisions; money is a
motivator.150 Money could also be used to incentivize cadaveric
organ donation. 151
A lump sum payment is a simple and effective way to
accomplish this objective.152 The choice to donate ones organs,
and whether to donate all viable organs or only certain ones,
should be at the sole discretion of the individual.153 A
reasonable monetary payment would provide incentive to do
so.154 To maximize the efficiency of the program, the amount of
financial compensation should vary based on the extent of the
decedents donation.155 The payment should be around $5,000
for each donated organ.156 For full donors, the payment would
usually amount to $15,000 or $20,000.157 This would encourage
people to register as donors, and to choose full instead of
partial donation.
148. Levingston with Becker, supra note 136 ([T]he promise of financial
gain would increase the pool of available organs.); see also supra Part III.B.1
2.
149. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
56 (1976).
150. See Thomas Li-Ping Tang, The Meaning of Money Revisited, 13 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 197, 197 (1992).
151. See Levingston with Becker, supra note 136 (To [a Nobel Prize-
winning] economist, it is clear that the major reason for the imbalance
between demand and supply of organs is that the United States . . . forbid[s]
the purchase and sale of organs.).
152. See Corley, supra note 63, at 116 ([M]oney would almost certainly
yield the greatest increase in usable organs . . . .).
153. See Morris, supra note 40, at 1126 ([I]n the United States the
ultimate decision about whether to become an organ and tissue donor still
rests with the individual . . . .).
154. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 134, at 230.
155. A varying payment structure is more cost-efficient because it would
compensate full donors more than partial donors. Less compensation for
partial donors would save money and incentivize full donation.
156. Further research and analysis beyond the scope of this Note would be
necessary to ascertain the most efficient amount of financial incentive.
157. On average, cadaveric organ donors provide three or four
transplantable organs. See About Transplantation, supra note 2 (stating that
one organ donor can save eight lives).
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The payment should be given to the donors estate. This
would provide the donor with autonomy over how the money is
spent: through his will, he could bequeath it to a family
member, donate it to a favored charity, or allocate it to satisfy a
debt.158 The payment could be used to fund the decedents
funeral or pay his final medical expenses.159 If the donor or his
family is opposed to the idea of financial compensation, the
money could be donated to charity, perhaps for medical
research to cure the disease that caused the donors death.160
By executing the payment upon donation rather than
registration, the issues of exploitation161 and coercion are
mostly avoided.162 The money would never be in possession of
the donor, so consenting to donation would not provide him
with any immediate funds.163 Rather, it would add a modest
158. See Corley, supra note 63, at 10405.
159. A scholarly article advocating for an open spot market for organs tells
the story of cadaveric organ donor Susan Sutton.
Her bones were used for reconstructive surgery, her skin helped burn
victims, her liver saved a life, and her corneas went to eye
transplants. With the exception of Susans estate, every party
involved in the collection and redistribution of Susans gifts reaped a
financial reward. [Because of limited financial resources,] Susans
parents were forced to bury Susan in a pine box without a chapel
service and with no grave marker.
Corley, supra note 63, at 102 (footnotes omitted). Financial compensation for
organ donation would help solve this problem.
160. The Ad Hoc Committee to End the Intractable Shortage of Human
Organs suggests the following approach and language to maintain respect for
purely altruistic donations:
Dear Mr. Smith/Ms. Jones, as you may know, it is our standard policy
to offer a gift of $5,000 to the estate of the deceased, as a way of
saying Thank you for giving the gift of life. The money can be used
to help offset funeral or hospital expenses, to donate to your loved
ones favorite charity, or simply to remain with the estate, to be used
in any manner the heirs see fit. No price can be placed upon the many
lives that can be saved by your gift. Our donation in return is merely
societys way of honoring the sacrifice you are being asked to make,
and is a token of our deep and sincere appreciation for your
generosity at this most difficult time.
Tabarrok, supra note 141.
161. See supra note 156. From this viewpoint, it seems more exploitative to
not pay people for donating their organs.
162. See, e.g., Sten, supra note 91, at 21718 (stating that a modest
posthumous payment in consideration of an organ donation although
tempting, would not be coercive in nature, in part because cadaveric organ
donation is a one time event, not a habitual income-producing situation
(internal quotation omitted)).
163. See supra notes 15862 and accompanying text.
2017] CADAVERIC ORGAN DONATION 295
amount to the donors estate for him to gift to his family or
favorite charity after he dies.164
The transplant recipients health insurance policy165
should fund the payment to the organ donors estate. The organ
recipient receives the most benefit from the transaction, so he
should be responsible for the cost.166 By structuring the
compensation per organ, the expense would likely be spread
amongst several payers.167 Although health insurance
providers may balk at an additional $5,000 expense for an
organ transplant, it would only increase the cost of a transplant
by less than two percent.168 Further, this proposal will save
money in the long run.169 A kidney recipient will no longer need
dialysis; a heart or lung recipient will soon leave the intensive
care unit; a burn trauma victim will recover much more
quickly.170 Not only will the recipients length and quality of life
be greatly improved after a successful transplant, but they will
incur significantly fewer medical expenses.171 Federal and state
governments could also contribute to the financial incentive
program, either through direct funding or by excluding the
payment from taxable income.172
Finally, the payment should be made only if donation
actually takes place. This will lower the total cost of the
164. See Corley, supra note 63, at 10405.
165. Most health insurance policies, including Medicare and Medicaid,
cover organ transplantation for patients with end-stage kidney failure. Organ
Transplantation: The Process, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://
www.organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2016).
166. While the organ donor and his or her family may feel altruistic or
morally right in making the donation, the recipient undoubtedly receives a
more tangible benefit  the gift of life. See Moorlock, Ives & Draper, supra
note 143, at 13435.
167. See About Transplantation, supra note 2 (stating one organ donor can
save eight lives). Under the proposed system, those eight people would pay for
the organs, thus spreading the expense amongst multiple parties.
168. The average cost of transplantation in 2011 ranged from $262,900 for
a single kidney to over $1,200,000 for a heart-lung transplant. UNITED
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, WHAT EVERY PATIENT NEEDS TO KNOW 30
(2013), https://www.unos.org/wp-content/uploads/unos/WEPNTK.pdf.
169. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
170. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
171. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
172. The Author advocates that the payment should be tax-exempt.
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program without decreasing its incentivization value.173 People
will be incentivized to consent to liberal donation in the hope
that their organs will be useful for transplantation when they
die.174 Their families will be incentivized to respect the
decedents intent to donate; if they object and stop the
donation, the decedents estate will no longer receive the
payment.175 This policy will also encourage prospective donors
to view the compensation as a bonus, rather than rely on it as a
source of income for their estate.176 By varying the amount of
payment based on the number of organs actually donated, the
compensation is more aligned with its objectives.177
This financial incentive program, coupled with a national
donor registry, will bring substantial improvements to the
American organ donation system.178 The main benefits,
including increased donations and organ supply, more respect
for healthcare decision autonomy, reduced costs and suffering
from the organ shortage, and improved national security, are
discussed next.
B. BENEFITS
Encouraging cadaveric organ donation with financial
incentives and improving the efficiency and legitimacy of
donative consent with a national registry will bring numerous
benefits to the healthcare system, economy, and national
security.179 First, citizens will be more likely to register as
donors.180 Second, families will be less likely to object to an
173. Restricting payments to organs that are actually donated cuts out the
inefficiencies of systems where simply registering to donate elicits payment,
because donors in such a system can renege or fail to follow through, thus
earning payment without actually donating. Cf. Corley, supra note 63, at 116.
174. Donating more organs will necessarily mean the possibility of more
compensation for the donors family. See supra notes 15557 and
accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 15557 and accompanying text.
176. For example, a prospective donors will may read: I wish to donate any
and all of my organs upon my death. Accordingly, I have registered with the
National Donor Registry. Should my organs be able to be donated, I bequeath
the financial compensation therefrom to my next of kin.
177. See supra note 155.
178. See infra Part III.B.
179. See generally David E. Harrington & Edward A. Sayre, Paying for
Bodies, but Not for Organs, REG., Winter 20062007, at 1819.
180. See id. at 19 (describing how modest payments may be able to coax
families to donate organs, tissues, and other body parts).
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intended donation.181 Third, increasing donations and
decreasing familial objections will help to alleviate the national
organ shortage.182 This will relieve people on the transplant
waiting list from years of suffering,183 and save the healthcare
system billions of dollars.184 Lastly, rectifying the organ
shortage will reduce the black market for organs and weaken
the financial strength of the criminal cartels that profit from
it.185
1. Increase Donations
The most significant benefit of a financial incentive for
cadaveric organ donation is that it would increase the number
of donations and therefore increase the supply of donated
organs.186 The organ shortage crisis is not an obscure, distant
theory; it is the harsh reality for 125,000 Americans and their
families, employers, and loved ones.187 The consequences of this
crisis are exorbitant: individuals on the transplant waiting list
suffer a shorter and lower quality of life, incur expensive
ongoing medical costs, and are often unable to work or care for
themselves.188 There is a strong public policy towards
encouraging . . . donations, but the current system has
failed.189 The figure below shows that over the past decade, the
181. See id. at 1819 ([F]inancial considerations are an important
component of the donation decision, not a negligible factor in an essentially
altruistic decision.).
182. See id. at 19 (explaining how a lack of market incentives leads to the
shortage of transplantable organs).
183. See Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 84041 (noting that patients
waiting for donations require continuous treatment).
184. Id. (indicating that the ban on donor compensation indicates losses of
billions of dollars each year).
185. See, e.g., Corley, supra note 63, at 99100 (noting that organ
trafficking and illegal payments will continue as long as the demand exceeds
the supply).
186. See sources cited infra note 198.
187. See Humphreys, supra note 6.
188. T. RANDOLPH BEARD, DAVID L. KASERMAN & RIGMAR OSTERKAMP,
THE GLOBAL ORGAN SHORTAGE: ECONOMIC CAUSES, HUMAN CONSEQUENCES,
POLICY RESPONSES 7274 (2013).
189. Morris, supra note 40, at 112627.
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waiting list has grown steadily, but the number of donations
and transplants has hardly increased at all.190
The gap between supply and demand for donated organs
must be closed, and a financial incentive is the most effective
way to do so.191 Objective research indicates that this proposal
will work.192 A recent scientific study found that states with
more regulated, and therefore more expensive, funerals have
higher rates of whole body cadaveric donation (where the
recipient, usually a medical school, pays for the funeral and
related expenses).193
[R]esidents in states with more stringent funeral regulations donate
4.9 more bodies per thousand deaths than those in unregulated
states. This difference is statistically significant and economically
meaningful. It indicates that financial considerations are an
190. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 12.
OPTN requires the following disclaimer in connection with the use of this
figure in reprint:
This work was supported in part by Health Resources and Services
Administration contract 234-2005-37011C. The content is the
responsibility of the authors alone and does not necessarily reflect the
views or policies of the Department of Health and Human Services,
nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or
organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.
See also Carlson, supra note 57, at 166 ([T]he waiting list [is] growing longer
at twice the rate of the number of transplants . . . .).
191. See generally Carlson, supra note 57, at 155.
192. See generally Harrington & Sayre, supra note 179.
193. See id. at 1619.
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important component of the donation decision, not a negligible factor
in an essentially altruistic decision.194
The authors conclude that this research indicates that
financial incentives for organ donation would increase
donations and likely eliminate the organ shortage.195 The
country of Iran provides additional evidence that financial
incentives can solve an organ shortage: Iran has legalized
financial payments to kidney donors, and is now the
only . . . country in the world [that] has eliminated the
shortage of transplant kidneys[.]196
People are unquestionably motivated by money.197 The
possibility of receiving several thousand dollars to bequeath to
their family or favorite charity will encourage people to donate
their organs and formally memorialize their intent to do so by
registering. Numerous scholars, supported by well-reasoned
theory and objective data, agree that financial incentives will
significantly increase organ donation.198 More donations means
more organs available for transplantation, which will reduce
the organ shortage crisis and the numerous problems it causes.
2. Decrease Familial Objections
The financial payment and improved national registry will
also discourage family members from overriding the decedents
194. Id. at 1718.
195. Id. at 19 ([T]he shortage could be eliminated by offering modest
payments for families to donate the organs of their deceased relatives.).
196. Tabarrok, supra note 141. In the Iranian system organs are not
bought and sold at the bazaar. Instead a non-profit, volunteer-run Dialysis
and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) mediates between recipients
and donors. Id. The United States OPTN could suitably provide this service.
See supra notes 10207 and accompanying text. The [Iranian] government
pays donors $1,200 plus limited health insurance coverage. In addition,
charitable organizations also provide remuneration to impoverished donors
and recipients may also contribute to donor remuneration. Tabarrok, supra
note 141.
197. See supra notes 14850 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 57, at 155 (reasoning that financial
incentives would encourag[e] organ donation from individuals who are not
inclined to donate within the current framework of pure altruism); Corley,
supra note 63, at 104 (Money is a method of financial compensation that
would likely yield the highest increase in usable organs.); Gorsline &
Johnson, supra note 70, at 28 ([S]ome individuals who are unwilling to
donate their organs may wish to sell them.).
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wishes and stopping an intended donation from taking place.199
Statutory law,200 as well as fundamental human rights,201
dictates that an individual should have complete autonomy
over the decision to donate his organs. Unfortunately, organ
procurement procedures customarily allow the familys
objection to trump the decedents wishes.202 [T]he major
reason why people [planning to donate] do not become organ
donors after death [is] the refusal of family members to give
consent to donation.203 This is a significant cause of the
national organ shortage because it terminates up to half of all
intended cadaveric organ donations.204
A posthumous payment to the donors estate would provide
a monetary incentive for families to consent to donation,
especially if the donor has bequeathed the money to his
family.205 The prospective donors estate or designated charity
will not receive the money if the family objects and quashes the
donation.206 In this case, the shortage could be eliminated by
offering modest payments for families to donate the organs of
their deceased relatives.207 The payment will incentivize
families to respect the decedents wishes and consent to the
donation.208 Further, family members will be less likely to
199. See generally Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families
Consent for Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation, 286 J. AM. MED.
ASSN 71, 71 (2001) (The major factor limiting the number of organ donors is
the low percentage of families who consent to donation.).
200. See supra notes 3438 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 8083 and accompanying text.
202. See Glazier, supra note 68, at 645. See also discussion supra Part II.C.
203. See David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise
and Fall in the United States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 295 (2009) (explaining
that presumed consent to donation, an alternative proposal to solve the organ
shortage crisis, failed because it did not overcome the critical barrier of
familiar objection).
204. See id. at 298 & n.7.
205. See supra notes 17475 and accompanying text.
206. This result is another reason why the payment should be made to the
donors estate upon a donation as opposed to the donor himself upon
registration. See Corley, supra note 63.
207. Harrington & Sayre, supra note 179, at 19.
208. Id. ([F]amilies are proud of [whole body donations for which they
receive compensation], often highlighting them in obituaries . . . . We think
that families will feel similarly about donating organs under a system where
procurement agencies help with funeral expenses.).
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attempt to revoke a donors quid pro quo agreement than a
unilateral charitable impulse.209
More importantly, the upgraded national registry will
improve the validity of the donors express intent.210 His desire
to donate will be memorialized in an accessible database, when
he is an adult, after informed consideration, and with clear and
specific directives.211 Families will certainly consider this type
of expression more persuasive and legitimate than the current
drivers license system,212 and will be less likely to ignore and
contravene it.213
The two proposed changes to the organ donation system
will result in fewer families objecting to organ procurement.214
This is highly beneficial in two ways. First, it will increase the
supply of donated organs and therefore help alleviate the organ
shortage.215 Not only that, but it will also result in more
adherence to the decedents wishes.216 Some may argue that
the inherent right to autonomy over healthcare decisions ends
at death.217 Many, however, believe that an individuals
decisions about his body, including the choice to donate his
organs posthumously, should be respected even after he passes
away.218 Selflessly saving several strangers lives through
209. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77, at 31819.
210. Id.
211. See generally the discussion supra Part II.B.1.
212. See generally the discussion supra Part II.B.1.
213. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
revealed that the familys knowledge of the decedents intent to donate was
positively correlated to giving consent. See Siminoff et al., supra note 199.
214. Cf. id. See generally supra notes 17475 and accompanying text.
215. Sten, supra note 91, at 219 (Compensating families for their donation
of cadaveric organs could produce more organs.)
216. E.g., Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 70, at 3132 (pointing to the
practice that physicians in the United States will defer to the families wishes
about organ donation over the deceased).
217. See, e.g., Smolensky, supra note 84, at 763 (noting that most rights for
individuals end at death); Naguit, supra note 87, at 251 (noting that the
Unites States recognizes a quasi-property right in the body of the deceased
for family members).
218. See, e.g., Bucklin, supra note 2 (making numerous legal and ethical
arguments why familiar objection should never impede an intended donation).
There is a moral imperative to accept the valid organ gift by a
decedent. An OPO [organ procurement organization] should take a
decedent donors organ gift even if the next of kin objects. An OPO
that seeks the consent of next of kin, when there is a known donation
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cadaveric organ donation is a noble election that should never
be circumvented by a family member.
An improved donor registration system and modest
financial incentive will help stop this tragedy from happening
and help solve the national organ shortage crisis.219 Remedying
the organ shortage will reduce the suffering and healthcare
costs caused by long waits for an organ, and fight the illegal
trade of organs.220
3. Reduce Deaths, Suffering, and Healthcare Costs
Financial compensation for organ donation will remedy the
national organ shortage crisis.221 Eliminating the organ
shortage will save222 and improve the lives of millions of
transplant recipients.223 Organ transplantation is often the
only treatment for end state organ failure, such as liver and
heart failure.224 Waiting for a donated organ means suffering
through the pain, expense, and slow, horrible death caused by
diseases such as coronary heart disease, cystic fibrosis,
by the decedent, violates the ethical principles of justice, utility, and
autonomy.
Id. at 354.
219. For a review of the benefits of financial incentives, see the discussion
supra Part III.B.1.
220. I will discuss these points in the following subsections: Part III.B.3
infra (suffering and healthcare costs); Part III.B.4 infra (fighting the illegal
organ trade).
221. Indeed, every economist who has written on this subject has reached
precisely the same conclusionthe organ shortage is caused by the legal ban
on donor payments and can be resolved successfully by eliminating that ban.
Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 828. Fundamental economic theory
explains that shortages are caused by prices held artificially below their
equilibrium, or market-clearing levels. As a result, shortages can generally be
resolved in a straightforward manner simply by allowing price to rise to its
market-determined value. Id.
222. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 12 (On
average, 22 people die each day while waiting for a transplant.). Over 100,000
people have died because they did not receive a donated organ. Corley, supra
note 63, at 97.
223. Over 120,000 people are currently on the OPTN waiting list for a full
organ, and a new person joins every ten minutes. Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, supra note 12. Further, more than one million
people each year could benefit from donated tissues, such as bone and skin.
Organ Donation Facts, LIVEONNY, http://www.donatelifeny.org/about-
donation/quick-facts-about-donation/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
224. Human Organ Transplantation, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.
who.int/transplantation/organ/en/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
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hepatitis, and other forms of severe organ failure.225 The
devastating physical, emotional, and financial costs associated
with these maladies would predominately be avoided by a
sufficient supply of donated organs.226
Modern medicine has improved so much that almost all
transplants are successful.227 After a successful transplant,
whether a skin graft or new heart, recipients are in
substantially better health.228 Many recover fully from their
end-stage organ failure, which allows them to return to living
at home, caring for themselves, working, and enjoying life.229
Transplant patients not only survive, but also return to their
families and communities to lead active, productive lives.230
Without a transplant, the repercussions of end-stage organ
failure on an individual and his family are devastating; even
worse is the fact that those hardships could be cured if a
donated organ was available.231 Even worse still is the
aggregate effect on national healthcare costs and the economy.
One very conservative estimate[ ] of the probable costs of the
current ban on donor compensation and resultant organ
shortage indicate[s] losses of billions of dollars each year.232
Although the proposed national registry and financial
incentive program will create additional costs, there is
overwhelming support that the overall economic effect of such a
225. Corley, supra note 63, at 119; see Organ Transplantation: The Process,
supra note 165.
226. Remedying the organ shortage would alleviate the continuous and
costly treatment of waiting for a transplant and the deaths of patients who
cannot obtain transplants. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 84041.
227. The current success rate is between eighty and ninety percent. Organ
Donation Facts, supra note 223.
228. See After the Transplant, TRANSPLANT LIVING, https://
transplantliving.org/after-the-transplant/staying-healthy/health-concerns/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016) (Most patients recover fully, return to work and
resume a normal, active life after receiving a new organ.).
229. See id. For individual stories of life after an organ transplant, see
Organ Donation and Organ Transplant Stories, FINGER LAKES DONOR
RECOVERY NETWORK, http://www.donorrecovery.org/stories/ (last visited Sept.
7, 2016).
230. Sten, supra note 91, at 197.
231. See Corley, supra note 63, at 93 (stating that 7000 people died in 2010
while on the organ transplant waitlist despite the fact that 12,000 individuals
die every year who are eligible donors).
232. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 841 (emphasis added).
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program will reduce total healthcare costs.233 Put simply, an
extra $5,000 payment to the donors estate is miniscule
compared to the cost of continued treatment for end-stage
organ failure, which is usually between $500,000 and
$1,000,000.234 A simulation analysis revealed that in a single
year, compensation for kidney donation would save the
healthcare system $1,342,190,000.235 This figure is for one
year, for one type of organ, and undoubtedly understate[d].236
Organ donation and transplantation saves lives and
money. Incentivizing donation with monetary compensation
will efficaciously and cost-effectively resolve the organ shortage
crisis.237 In addition, remedying the shortage will help stop the
illegal sale of organs on the international black market.238
4. Combat Red Market Crime
When demand exceeds supply, especially in the case of
live-saving transplantable organs, people may resort to
desperate measures. Although the United States and almost
every other country ban the sale of human organs,239 an illegal
underground market has been flourishing for several years.240
According to the World Health Organization, one in ten
transplanted organs are illegally purchased on this red
market.241 Americans are one of the worst offenders, engaging
in transplant tourism (traveling abroad to receive dangerous
and illegal organ transplants) at alarming rates.242
The red market allows criminals to reap outlandish profits
buying and selling human flesh at the expense of
233. Numerous studies of healthcare costs for . . . transplant patients have
found substantial savings associated with transplants. Id. at 847.
234. Id. at 84748; see also Donald A. Brand et al., Waiting for a Liver
Hidden Costs of the Organ Shortage, 10 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 1001, 1005
07 (2004) (reaching a similar conclusion after analyzing the financial
implications of liver transplants).
235. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 848 ([E]ach additional
cadaveric donation saves about $576,000 for kidneys alone.).
236. Id.
237. See sources cited supra note 198.
238. Beard & Kaserman, note 92, at 8485.
239. Tabarrok, supra note 141.
240. Scott Carney, The Rise of the Red Market, FOREIGN POLY (May 30,
2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/30/the-rise-of-the-red-market/.
241. Id.
242. Roberts, supra note 5, at 76869.
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impoverished, kidnapped, or executed victims.243 The volume of
red market trade is estimated at several billion dollars per
year.244 Frighteningly, the newest organizations to join the
illegal organ trade are the Mexican drug cartels, and their
practice of kidnapping children to harvest their organs is
particularly gruesome.245 The Mexican drug cartels represent a
clear and present danger to the . . . national security of the
United States.246 As the cartels continue to profit from
involvement in illegal organ trafficking and the red market, the
danger they pose to the United States continues to grow.247
Eliminating the organ shortage with financial
compensation for organ donation would eliminate the red
market.248 Criminal organizations involved in the red market,
including the too-close-for-comfort Mexican cartels, would be
financially weakened.249 Fewer Americans would travel abroad
to obtain dangerous illegal transplants, fewer people would be
exploited, kidnapped, or killed for their organs, and less money
would be collected by one of the biggest threats to our national
security.
243. Carney, supra note 240.
In Romania, Moldova, Turkey, and Egypt, brokers can easily acquire
kidneys for $3,000 and sell them for $50,000 or more. In 2008, an
Indian broker was arrested for kidnapping people from New Delhi
slums and literally stealing their kidneys to sell to foreign transplant
patients. In China, selling the organs of executed prisoners continues
to be an official state policy.
Id.
244. SCOTT CARNEY, THE REDMARKET 3 (2011).
245. Olga R. Rodriguez, Police Nab Cartel Member in Organ Trafficking
Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news
/local-news/20140317-police-nab-cartel-member-in-organ-trafficking-case.ece.
246. Arthur Rizer, Hannibal at the Gate: Border Kids, Drugs, and Guns 
and the Mexican Cartel War Goes On, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 48, 94 (2015).
247. See generally id.
248. [B]lack market activity is the direct consequence of shortages . . . .
When the shortage[ ]and concomitantly, the profitability of black market
activitydisappear[s], the black market disappears. Beard & Kaserman,
supra note 92, at 83435.
249. An expert in national security law has made the argument that
decriminalizing or legalizing marijuana will reduce the Mexican cartels
revenue, profit, and power by shrinking the black market for drugs. Rizer,
supra note 246, at 47. Shrinking the red market by legalizing financial
compensation for organ donations would similarly reduce the cartels revenue,
profit, and power. Id.
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C. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the numerous benefits of increasing the donated
organ supply with financial incentives and an improved
national registry, some limitations must be observed. Although
several scholars advocate for financial compensation for living
donors,250 this presents issues of exploitation, irresponsibility,
and health complications for the donor.251 Only compensating
for cadaveric donations avoids these problems.252
Cadaveric organ donation of children is another tricky
issue. Under the current legal framework, the parents or legal
guardians of a minor child are unilaterally authorized to
donate their childs organs posthumously.253 This may be the
best option because children generally cannot give legal
consent,254 but further analysis is necessary regarding the
interplay of this rule and financial incentives.
In addition to the proposed financial incentive program
and national donor registry, other recommendations would
improve the efficiency and public opinion of the organ donation
and procurement process. First, hospitals and organ
procurement organizations should adhere to federal law and
never permit familial objection to stop an intended donation.255
Second, hospitals should always treat a donors body with
utmost respect, preserve the option of an open casket funeral,
ensure that the body is timely available for burial, and observe
any relevant religious considerations.256 Third, hospitals and
250. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in
the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2007).
251. See Kelly Lobas, Living Organ Donations: How Can Society Ethically
Increase the Supply of Organs?, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 475, 48896 (2006).
252. See id. at 488 ([L]iving organ donations raise concerns not present
with cadaver donations.).
253. Nicole Hebert, Creating a Life to Save a Life: An Issue Inadequately
Addressed by the Current Legal Framework Under Which Minors Are
Permitted to Donate Tissue and Organs, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 337, 353
54, 367 (2008).
254. Id. at 353, 367.
255. See Bucklin, supra note 2, at 337 (explaining how organ procurement
organizations typically do not accept a decedents organ donation without
ratification from the decedents next of kin).
256. See Funeral Traditions of Different Religions, EVERPLANS,
https://www.everplans.com/articles/funeral-traditions-of-different-religions
(last visited Sept. 7, 2016). For example, the Muslim faith dictates the body
should be buried as soon as possible after death. Muslim Funeral Traditions,
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medical researchers should seek to more fully utilize each
cadaveric donor.257 Finally, additional resources should be
spent on education regarding organ donation, especially if
changes such as financial incentives or a national registry take
place.258 National advertising campaigns have resulted in some
success at increasing donations.259
IV. CONCLUSION
The combination of federal laws that prohibit valuable
consideration for organ donation and hospital customs that
prioritize family objections over the decedents express intent
has caused a devastating organ shortage crisis. This crisis
jeopardizes national security and the American way of life in
several ways. Hundreds of thousands of people suffer and die
waiting for an organ transplant because there is a shortage of
donated organs.260 This increases national healthcare costs and
creates an illegal black market for organs, which criminal
organizations such as the Mexican drug cartels benefit and
profit from.261
The national organ shortage could be cured by introducing
a system of monetary compensation for cadaveric organ
donation. This Note advocates that a payment of approximately
$5,000 should be paid to the donors estate by the transplant
recipients health insurance policy when an organ is
posthumously donated.262 Further, an improved national
registry would improve the validity of donative intent.263
These programs would generate multiple benefits. People
would be incentivized by the possibility of additional money for
EVERPLANS, https://www.everplans.com/articles/muslim-funeral-traditions
(last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
257. See Bucklin, supra note 2 (illustrating that only an average of 3.37
organs are currently recovered from cadaveric donors); Orentlicher, supra note
203, at n.7 ([O]rgan transplants could more than quintuple if all usable
organs were transplanted.).
258. See State Organ Donation Legislation, supra note 42.
259. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77, at 30204.
260. Corley, supra note 63, at 97 (From 1995-2010, approximately 105,000
individuals in the United States have died while waiting on an organ to
become available.).
261. See Mexican Cartel Member Busted for Child Organ Trafficking, supra
note 9; Beard & Kaserman, supra note 92, at 83435, 847.
262. See supra note 156.
263. See generally Nadel & Nadel, supra note 77.
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their estate, so organ donations would increase.264 Also,
families would be less likely to override an intended donation
when they stand to benefit financially from consent and the
donors intent is more legitimate.265 More donations and fewer
objections will increase the supply of donated organs and
remedy the organ shortage crisis.266 This will reduce deaths,
suffering, and healthcare costs of those waiting for an organ,
and reduce the financial strength of the criminals who profit off
the red market.267
The federal government should immediately begin
implementing a financial incentivization program and national
donor registry. The additional cost is a small price to pay to
save lives, money, and the integrity of our national security.
264. E.g., Harris & Alcorn, supra note 134; Corley, supra note 63.
265. See generally supra notes 15557.
266. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2.
267. See, e.g., supra note 184 and accompanying text; Rizer, supra note
246.
